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Abstract 
 
Physician-assisted death (PAD) has been enacted in a number of international jurisdictions, with 
several extending access to PAD for persons whose condition is not terminal, including those 
with a mental disorder.  We argue that based on the state of the literature, it is too early to make 
well-defined recommendations on how relevant fields can proceed legally, ethically, and 
clinically, particularly in regard to PAD for persons with a mental disorder.  The aim of this 
paper is to introduce a framework for further discussions on PAD for persons with a mental 
disorder to stimulate thoughtful and considered debate in our field.  We provide a brief 
discussion of the principles that guide regulatory frameworks on PAD practices worldwide, 
including a discussion of jurisdictions in Europe and North America that allow PAD for those 
suffering from an incurable non-terminal disease, illness, or disability.  Next, we present a 
conceptual framework as a series of questions that address legal, ethical, and clinical dilemmas 
arising from this trend.  We conclude with a summary of guidelines on the practice of PAD from 
international jurisdictions in order to assist in the development of potential legal and professional 
regulations.  
 
Keywords: international legislation, mental disorder, physician-assisted death, practice 
guidelines 
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A Conceptual Framework for Thinking about Physician-Assisted Death for Persons with a 
Mental Disorder  
 
  As a result of rapid advances in medical science, persons with incurable or degenerative 
diseases can live longer (Shrestha, 2005), even though their quality of life can be severely 
diminished (Breitbart et al., 2000).  Concerns for personal autonomy (Boudreau & Somerville, 
2014), coupled with limitations in palliative care for alleviating pain and suffering (Knaul, 
Farmer, Bhadelia, Berman, & Horton, 2015), have fostered supportive attitudes towards the use 
of assisted death among some practitioners in the fields of philosophy (Gill, 2009), medicine 
(Lee, Price, Rayner & Hotopf, 2009), and law (Hendry et al., 2013).  Despite increased attention 
to assisted death in current academic discourse and policy-based literature, psychologists have 
been relatively absent in the discussion (but see Achille & Ogloff, 2004; Appel, 2007; Bergmans, 
Widdershoven, & Widdershoven-Heerding, 2013; Deschepper, Distelmans, & Bilsen, 2014; 
Johnson, Cramer, Conroy, & Gardner, 2014; Macleod, 2012; Parker, 2012; 2013; Schoevers, 
Asmus, & van Tilburg, 2014).  However, given the shift in assisted death practice in some 
jurisdictions from persons with a terminal medical condition to persons with a mental disorder, 
we believe psychologists can and should re-enter the discussion.    
 
 Over the past few decades, laws legalizing assisted death for adults with a terminal or 
general medical condition have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions, including Canada, the 
Benelux countries of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, as well as several U.S. states.  
Some jurisdictions in Europe and North America have also extended access to assisted death to 
adults with a mental disorder or have left open the possibly that persons with a mental disorder 
may qualify for assisted death.  Based on this shift in assisted death practices, further discussion 
is needed concerning whether assisted death should be approved when a mental disorder is the 
primary or sole medical condition and whether safeguards are needed to regulate assisted death 
for persons with a mental disorder separate from or in addition to regulations for persons with a 
terminal or general medical condition.  
 
  In 2000, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law published a Special Issue on physician-
assisted death (hereinafter PADi) with a specific focus on the implementation and implications of 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, adopted in 1997 (Benjamin, Werth, & Gosten, 2000).  The 
Special Issue comprised 24 articles from various experts in the field who provided reviews and 
commentary on practice, policies, and empirical evidence on PAD (for a summary of the special 
issue see Benjamin, 2000).  PAD for persons with a mental disorder as a sole diagnosis was not 
thoroughly debated in this special issue, perhaps because it was not permissible under Oregon 
law and there was an apparent consensus at that time that PAD is not appropriate for persons 
with a mental disorder (Baron, 2000; Burt, 2000; Illingworth & Bursztajn, 2000; Jamison, 2000; 
Kerkhof, 2000; King, Kim, & Cowell, 2000; Martyn & Bourguignon, 2000; Rosenfeld, 2000a, 
2000b; Werth, Benjamin, & Farrenkopf, 2000; Werth, Farrenkopf, & Benjamin, 2000; 
Youngner, 2000).  Things have changed.  When the Special Issue was published, PAD for 
persons with a mental disorder was only permitted in Switzerland.  Since 2000 seven additional 
jurisdictions permit PAD and three allow persons with a mental disorder to request assistance 
with death (see Table 1).  There appears to be a movement to extend PAD generally, with some 
jurisdictions extending PAD to persons with a mental disorder, and thus there is a need to reopen 
the discussion from psychology.   
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-- Insert Table 1 about here-- 
  
 PAD is controversial in the context of many different types of medical conditions, but in 
the context of a mental disorder discussion about PAD is especially fraught.  On the one hand, 
one could argue that when available treatment has been found to be inadequate, persons with a 
mental disorder should have the same rights as persons with a terminal or general medical 
condition to receive relief from suffering and maintain self-determination and control over the 
circumstances regarding their death (Doyal & Doyal, 2001).  On the other hand, it could be 
argued that the nature and origin of their suffering and longer life expectancy compared to 
persons with a terminal medical condition makes PAD for persons with a mental disorder 
problematic or unacceptable (Guedj et al., 2005; O’Neill, Feenan, Hughes, & McAlister, 2003).  
The desire for death may be a reflection of the complex nature of the mental disorder, in which a 
sense of hopelessness or suicidal ideation may be symptoms of or triggered by the underlying 
condition (Nock et al., 2008).  In addition, PAD for persons with a mental disorder raises societal 
concerns, such as the fear of a gradual extension of PAD to persons who lack requisite decisional 
capacity or that persons with a mental disorder may be coerced into choosing assistance in death 
(Appel, 2007; Dembo, 2010; Kelly & McLouglin, 2002).   
 
  We argue that based on the state of the literature, it is too early to make well-defined 
recommendations on how relevant fields should proceed legally, ethically and clinically in 
regard to PAD for persons with a mental disorder.  The aim of this paper is to introduce a 
framework for further discussions on PAD for persons with a mental disorder to stimulate 
thoughtful and considered debate in our field.  We begin with a brief discussion of international 
jurisdictions that currently allow PAD; we provide a slightly longer discussion of jurisdictions in 
Europe and North America that allow PAD for those suffering from an incurable non-terminal 
disease, illness, or disability.  To be clear, this discussion is not a comprehensive review of 
relevant laws; rather it is an analysis of international principles that guide practices to legalize or 
decriminalize PAD.ii  This review will demonstrate that PAD for persons with a mental disorder 
may be becoming more common.  Next, we offer a conceptual framework, presented as a series 
of questions, to consider some of the legal, ethical, and clinical dilemmas arising from this trend.  
Each question is addressed in the context of legal principles, public policy, and psychological 
research.  In developing this framework, it was not our goal to fully examine each issue or to 
address all questions related to the regulation of PAD for persons with a mental disorder.  Rather, 
it is our goal to stimulate conversation on key issues related to this important issue.  That being 
said, policy has been enacted internationally to allow for PAD and health care providers, policy 
makers, and legal professionals are required to make principled decisions that should be based on 
the best available evidence.  In order to assist in the development of potential legal and 
professional regulations, we conclude with a summary of guidelines on the practice of PAD from 
international jurisdictions.  
 
Development of PAD Worldwideiii,iv  
 
 In at least 142 countries and 45 U.S. states assisted death is illegal, with laws stipulating 
punishments for aiding, abetting, or encouraging death (see Mishara & Weisstub, 2015).  
However, in at least twelve jurisdictions PAD has been decriminalized or legalized.v  
Specifically, Colombia, Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the U.S. state of Montana have used 
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court rulings to decriminalize PAD in certain circumstances, whereas Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and the U.S. states of California, Oregon, Washington, and Vermont passed 
legislation to legalize PAD (see Table 1 for a summary of the important characteristics of the 
laws in these jurisdictions).  As is clear from Table 1, there is variation in the conditions under 
which PAD may be requested.   
 
  Most jurisdictions that have legalized or decriminalized PAD require a terminal medical 
condition as a requirement to receive PAD and do not permit PAD for persons with a mental 
disorder.  For instance, in five U.S. states, persons with a mental disorder are explicitly 
prohibited from access to PAD (Montana Death with Dignity Act, 2010; Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act, 1997; Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act, 2013; The End of Life Option 
Act, 2016; Washington Death with Dignity Act, 2009).  However, in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, and Switzerland PAD is permitted for persons with an irremediable mental disorder, 
in the absence of another medical condition (e.g., Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder).  In Belgium, 
PAD is legal if the individual is competent,vi has unbearable suffering, and is suffering from a 
severe and incurable disorder (The Belgium Act on Euthanasia, 2002).  In the Netherlands, a 
competent individual may be granted PAD if their request is voluntary, enduring, well 
considered, they have unbearable psychological or physical suffering, and other options for care 
have been exhausted (Royal Dutch Medical Association, 2002).  In Luxemburg, PAD is 
permitted as long as the individual has a grave and incurable illness, unbearable physical or 
psychological suffering from a medically based condition, and their request for PAD is stable 
over time (Law of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 2008).  In Switzerland, an 
individual requesting PAD does not need to have a terminal medical condition or be a Swiss 
Citizen; however, he or she must be experiencing unbearable suffering, a disability, and a 
consistent wish to die (Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences, 2012). 
 
   Although it is possible for persons with a mental disorder to request PAD in these 
jurisdictions, the practice is rare. Most requests from persons with a mood disorder in the 
Netherlands are declined (Field & Curtice, 2009) and no cases involving PAD on the basis of a 
mental disorder have been reported in Luxemburg to date (Luxembourg National Commission 
for Monitoring and Evaluation of Euthanasia, 2013).  In Belgium mental suffering from either a 
mental disorder or other medical condition is explicitly acknowledged as a valid basis for PAD 
(Naudts et al., 2006); however, the number of persons that receive PAD on the basis of a mental 
disorder is small (Federal Evaluation and Control Commission of Euthanasia, n.d.).  In 
Switzerland requests for PAD on the basis of mental disorder are granted only in a small 
proportion of cases (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2009). 
 
 PAD for persons with a mental disorder has primarily arisen in European jurisdictions; 
however, an important case in Canada represents the first case in North America in which PAD 
may extend to persons with a mental disorder.  In Canada, PAD is currently prohibited under 
section 14 and section 241 (b) of the Canadian Criminal Code.  However, on February 6, 2015, 
the Supreme Court of Canada decriminalized PAD in Carter v. Canada (2015), ruling that “the 
prohibition on physician-assisted [death] is void insofar as it deprives a competent adult of such 
assistance where (1) the person affected clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) the 
person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or 
disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances 
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of his or her condition” (para. 4).vii  The Supreme Court of Canada held that prohibiting a 
competent person from access to PAD infringes the individual’s right to life, liberty, and security 
of the person, rights guaranteed in section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
 
  Importantly, access to PAD was not restricted to persons with a terminal medical 
condition; similar to Belgium the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, the Supreme Court 
of Canada stated that a competent individual suffering from any medical condition that, in the 
individual’s opinion, leads to intolerable physical or psychological suffering will be permitted to 
request PAD. This ruling certainly leaves open the possibility that persons with a mental disorder 
will qualify.   
 
The major implication from this brief review of international practices generally and the 
recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in particular is that there are trends in PAD policy that 
are indicative of changes in attitudes regarding the availability of PAD, including the extension 
of access to PAD for persons with a mental disorder.  The legislative trend to extend PAD to 
persons with a mental disorder make it imperative that issues related to  PAD for persons with a 
mental disorder be principled and thoroughly discussed.viii  
 
A Framework for Extending Access to PAD for Persons with a Mental Disorder: 
Legal, Ethical, and Clinical Considerations 
 
  Given recent legal developments in Canada and other international jurisdictions, it seems 
evident that PAD is becoming available to a wider group of individuals.  In this section, we 
present a series of questions for researchers, policy makers, and practitioners to consider when 
thinking about PAD for persons with a mental disorder (see Figure 1).  Our objective is to 
present some (not all) of the key issues and to review relevant public policy and psychological 
research to inform continued discussion. 
 
-- Insert Figure 1 about here -- 
 
PAD for Persons with a Mental Disorder 
 
  Should a Mental Disorder be a Ground for Requesting PAD?  Changes in public 
policy that extend the right to request PAD on the basis of a mental disorder stem from our 
growing understanding of the biological basis of certain mental disorders (Goldberg & Goodyer, 
2014).  If PAD is a legal option for persons suffering from a medical condition, it is unclear why 
access to PAD should not be available to persons suffering from a mental disorder (Doyal & 
Doyal, 2001).  However, the similarities between general medical conditions and mental 
disorders, though strong, are not complete.  There is still a limited understanding of the 
underlying causes of common mental disorders (e.g., Depression, Schizophrenia) making the 
prognosis of mental disorders more difficult to ascertain (Kelly & McLoughlin, 2002).  
Moreover, there are important qualitative differences between requests for PAD between, for 
example, a person with a terminal medical condition who is likely to die in the near future and a 
request from an otherwise physically healthy person with Major Depressive Disorder (Cowley, 
2013; Gopal, 2015).  While some studies indicate that the acceptance rate of PAD for persons 
with a terminal medical condition among ethicists, medical professionals, and the general public 
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is high (e.g., Cohen et al., 2006; Inghelbrecht, Bilsen, Mortier, & Deliens, 2010), this is not the 
case for PAD on the basis of psychological suffering due to a mental disorder (Cowley, 2013; 
Kouwenhoven et al., 2012).  
 
 Despite its controversial nature, in Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland, the existence of a terminal medical condition is not necessary for PAD, rather it is 
considered to be less important than the presence of “intolerable and hopeless suffering” 
(Schoevers et al., 2014).  Mental disorders can lead to intense suffering that may occur as a result 
of the mental disorder or symptoms of the mental disorder (e.g., anxiety, depression, 
disorientation, depersonalization, hallucinations), the prospect of living with a severe mental 
disorder (e.g., loss of identity, loss of purpose), psychosocial loses that are incurred by the 
recurrence of hospitalization (e.g., difficulty maintaining employment), or symptoms that result 
from long-term use of psychotropic drugs (e.g., weight gain, movement disorders; Berghmans et 
al., 2013; Hewitt, 2007).  For these reasons, it has been argued that suffering from a mental 
disorder is not different from suffering from a terminal or general medical condition, and that, in 
some cases, providing PAD to persons with a severe mental disorder who have made well-
considered and voluntary requests can be legally and ethically justified (Berghmans et al., 2013).  
 
  Should PAD be Available for All Types of Mental Disorders?  Most debate on PAD 
and mental disorders has focused on requests for PAD from persons with Major Depressive 
Disorder (i.e., as a subgroup of persons to be excluded; Ganzini, Leong, Fenn, Silva, & 
Weinstock, 2000; but see also Schuklenk & van de Vathorst, 2015).ix  However, in most 
jurisdictions that include a mental disorder as a reason to request PAD, distinctions are not made 
across mental disorders.x  There have been controversial cases in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Switzerland in which PAD has been provided on the basis of other mental disorders (see 
Appendix A).  The DSM-5 and ICD-10 list 157 and 99 forms of mental disorder (McCarron, 
2013; World Health Organization, 1992), which fall into 20 and 10 general categories, 
respectively.  While a clinical diagnosis of a mental disorder does not necessarily mean that an 
individual will meet criteria for PAD xi without clear direction all DSM-5 (e.g., binge eating 
disorder, insomnia, caffeine withdrawal, premenstrual dysphoric disorder) or ICD-10 mental 
disorders (e.g., paedophilia, pathological gambling, transsexualism) could be considered when 
requests for PAD are made.  A significant risk of permitting PAD on the basis of such a large 
range of pathologies is the high number of individuals that would qualify.  Worldwide mental 
health concerns are common - approximately 30% of the population is estimated to experience at 
least one mental disorder in any given year – and are the leading cause of disability (World 
Health Organization, 2004).  In the U.S. and Canada alone, approximately 10% to 25% of the 
population (~79 million and 3.5 million people in the U.S. and Canada, respectively) meets 
criteria each year (Kessler et al., 2009; Pearson, Janz, & Ali, 2012).  As such, one needs to 
consider whether a person who receives any diagnosis from the DSM-5 or ICD-10 is de facto 
(i.e., in fact, but not determined by legal procedures) a person who can request PAD or if PAD 
should be restricted to only a subset of mental disorders, and if so, which disorders? 
 
Defining Grievous and Irremediable Mental Disorder 
 
  Should Persons who Refuse Alternative Treatment Qualify for PAD?  If a mental 
disorder is a valid basis on which to request PAD, careful diagnosis and evaluation of the 
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person’s prognosis are required to determine whether the condition is grievous and irremediable 
(i.e., there is a lack of prospect of improvement, Berghmans et al., 2013).  In jurisdictions that 
permit PAD, persons with a terminal medical condition are not required to undertake treatment 
that is intolerable to the individual to be eligible to receive assistance with death.  Whether this 
should also be permitted in the case of a mental disorder raises many questions.  What if it is a 
new diagnosis or there have been few attempts at treatment?  What if the treatment option (e.g., 
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy) involves side effects that most would consider tolerable?  
Should we respect the rights of persons with a mental disorder to refuse treatment or should 
treatment be required before a request for assistance with death is considered?  If some treatment 
is required, how much treatment and who should decide if treatment is successful?  Should 
different requirements exist for individuals with no response to one treatment or no response to 
all available treatments?   
 
  In the U.S. and Canada as elsewhere, competent individuals have the right to refuse 
unwanted treatment for a general medical condition, even if the consequences of such decisions 
entail a serious risk of death or are contrary to medical advice (e.g., Title 42, Code of Federal 
Regulations; Section 7, Charter of Rights and Freedoms).  Requiring competent persons with a 
mental disorder to undergo alternative treatments before a request for PAD is considered but not 
requiring the same of persons with a general medical condition may be considered 
discriminatory under human rights law (e.g., Title III, Americans with Disabilities Act; Canadian 
Human Rights Act, 1985).  Indeed, some have argued that the right to make treatment decisions 
should be based on decisional capacity, not the presence of a mental disorder (Callaghan et al., 
2013).  Nevertheless, restricted access to PAD if the individual has refused psychiatric care may 
be required to ensure that persons with a mental disorder that has not been adequately treated do 
not prematurely receive assistance with death.   
 
   What if the Person has Been Successfully Treated or Has Had Their Symptoms  
Remit in the Past?  For some mental disorders full remission of symptoms is possible with 
treatment; however, this is not a cure as symptom relapse is possible (Nierenberg et al., 2010) 
and persons may continue to experience residual impairment in psychosocial functioning and/or 
a diminished quality of life (Tranter, O’Donovan, Chandarana, & Kennedy, 2002).  Further, 
some mental disorders are characterized by intermittent and short-lived episodes of mental 
impairment or acute symptoms, followed by periods where the individual is symptom free 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Whether these types of mental disorders meet the 
legal definition of an irremediable medical condition is not clear.  In the context of mental 
disorders, Switzerland requires that a distinction is made between persons who wish to have 
assistance with death due to temporary psychological impairment and persons with a chronic and 
severe mental disorder (Appel, 2007).  However, it remains unclear for how long a person is 
required to endure the current level of severity of symptoms of their mental disorder and for how 
long should the periods of remission be for the suffering to be considered “intolerable” or 
“irremediable.”  It will likely be important to consider the history of treatment attempts and 
relapse.   
 
 What if there is No Treatment or the Individual is not Responsive to Available 
Treatments?  While it is well-established that treatment helps alleviate symptoms of a mental 
disorder for the majority of people (Lambert & Archer, 2006), treatment is not always effective 
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and can be more challenging (or symptoms more resistant or irremediable) for some disorders, 
such as Personality Disorders, Delusional Disorder, and Chronic Depression than others (Nathan 
& Gorman, 2015).  In the Dutch system, PAD is not permissible if, to current medical 
knowledge, “there is a reasonable chance of recovery, within a surveyable period of time, 
whereby the suffering caused by the treatment is not disproportionate to the expected outcome” 
(Royal Dutch Medical Association Special Committee on the Acceptability of Termination of 
Life, 1997).  Although the Dutch medical guidelines broadly recommend that a mental disorder 
can only be considered irremediable if all applicable pharmacological and psychotherapeutic 
interventions have been tried (Tholen et al., 2009), there is no clear criteria (e.g., years with the 
mental disorder, different medications tried, and years in treatment) that can help determine 
whether an individual’s condition is considered irremediable (Campbell & Aulisio, 2012).  The 
discovery of effective treatment for a mental disorder may take longer than for a general medical 
condition (Schoevers et al., 2014).  When a request for PAD is made by a person with a mental 
disorder in the Netherlands, health care professionals have to declare that the individual fulfills 
the criteria for an irremediable medical condition if there is (1) no reasonable chance of 
improvement, (2) there are no available treatments or the treatments and other interventions are 
minimally effective, or (3) the side-effects of the treatment outweigh possible benefits 
(Berghmans et al., 2013).  
 
How Should Intolerable Suffering be Assessed? 
 
 In Belgium, Canada, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, intolerable physical 
or psychological suffering is specified as a necessary criterion for PAD.  How “intolerable” is 
assessed deserves consideration.  In the literature, the concept of “intolerable suffering” has not 
been adequately defined, and views on this concept are in a state of flux (Dees et al., 2009).  
Some scholars have opined that this concept is purely subjective, dependent on personal values, 
and determined by the patient (i.e., the individual experiences the suffering as intolerable, even if 
another would not).  Research shows that persons with a mental disorder are able to make 
reliable self-reported qualify of life judgments (Baumstark et al., 2013).  However, in some 
cases, a mental health patient’s judgment may be temporally distorted (Deschepper et al., 2014).  
Other scholars (e.g., Berghmans et al., 2013) have suggested that the test contain both a 
subjective (i.e. what the individual believes is intolerable suffering) and an objective element 
(i.e., what a reasonable person would find intolerable in the circumstances) to ensure that the 
patient’s subjective assessment is not due to distorted judgment.  However, there is no clear 
guidance on what objective standard to apply.  By definition, psychological suffering has few 
outward signs.  As such, it may be difficult to objectively measure intolerable psychological 
suffering and physicians may have to rely on patient self-report or make inferences from the 
individual’s level of impairment in functioning. 
 
Researchers have developed several self-report tools to assess psychological pain (e.g., 
Holden, Mehta, Cunningham, & Mcleod, 2001; Olié, Guillaume, Jaussent, Courtet, & Jollant, 
2010; Orbach, Mikulincer, Sirota, & Gilboa-Schechtman, 2003).  These tools focus on the 
frequency and the intensity of painful feelings, and not on the source(s) of psychological pain.  
When assessing the degree of suffering in the context of a mental disorder, one cannot ignore the 
contribution of external factors.  Risk factors associated with suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, 
and completed suicide, such as hopelessness, financial problems, lack of caring relationships, 
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stigma, and social isolation, are more prevalent among persons with a mental disorder than the 
general population (Beck, Brown, Berchick, Stewart, & Steer, 2014; Maris, Berman, & 
Silverman, 2000; Rüsch, Zlati, Black & Thornifcroft, 2014; van Orden et al., 2010).  As such, a 
test of intolerable psychological suffering that ignores these causes could lead to PAD for 
potentially malleable external factors or adverse environmental conditions (e.g., social stigma, 
chronic poverty, intolerant family; Dembo, 2010).  For instance, if a person with a mental 
disorder internalizes the negative stereotypes associated with having a mental disorder (e.g., 
dangerousness), hopelessness may follow (Livingston & Boyd, 2010).  As such when 
determining whether to consider requests for PAD, it is crucial that the complex interplay 
between the mental disorder and social factors be considered to determine whether suffering can 
be treated or managed.  
  
Although some external factors can be targeted for psychological interventions (e.g., 
stress, coping resources, self-stigma, social isolation; Chehil & Kutcher, 2012), others may be 
intractable or require long-term, population-level interventions (e.g., anti-stigma interventions to 
reduce the occurrence of discrimination against mental health populations; Rüsch et al., 2014).  
If an individual with a mental disorder requests PAD due to the effects of intolerable 
environmental factors that are not likely to change soon, is this grounds to allow or deny the 
request?  If social stigma is an acceptable source of intolerable suffering, why would a person 
with a mental disorder be permitted to request PAD while members of other groups or 
communities who may also be the target of social intolerance (i.e., on the basis of age, disability, 
religion, ethnicity, social class, sexual orientation, indigenous background, national origin, or 
gender; Hays, 2001), not be permitted to make such a request?  Although the request for PAD 
must be linked to a recognizable medical condition, cases in Belgium and the Netherlands 
suggest the possibility that the definition of intolerable psychological suffering may be extended 
beyond the intention of the legislation (Huxtable & Moller, 2007).  For instance, in the 
Netherlands there was a case of an elderly man who requested and received PAD because he was 
tired of life and all his friends and relatives were dead (Cohen-Almagor, 2004). 
 
 If the external factors that cause intolerable suffering are remediable but there is little 
chance that the individual will have access to the remediation (e.g., residential care may be 
available to persons with financial means, but the state is unlikely to make it universally 
available), should PAD be permitted?  Access to remediation may be possible in countries where 
there is universal health care (e.g., Canada, the Netherlands), but even then psychiatric treatment, 
especially long-term treatment with a clinical psychologist, may not be covered by freely 
available basic medical coverage.  Without guaranteed access to treatment to alleviate 
psychological suffering, its availability to a few is of little comfort to those who suffer enduring 
psychological pain without access to help. 
 
Mental Disorder and Competence 
 
  Should There be an Assumption that a Person Requesting PAD is Competent to 
Make Such a Request?  Although the standards relevant to the assessment of decisional 
capacity vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based upon case law, relevant statues, and/or 
procedural requirements (Leo, 1999), in general, it is presumed that every individual is 
competent to make medical decisions for themselves unless proven otherwise (Appelbaum & 
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Grisso, 1995).  Some scholars have argued that a decision about death can never be made 
rationally by persons with a mental disorder (Zaubler & Sullivan, 1996) or that the presence of 
certain mental disorders (i.e., Major Depressive Disorder) should automatically render a person 
incompetent to request PAD (Ganzini et al., 2000).  Symptoms of a mental disorder may impair 
an individual’s judgement, awareness, and decision-making, such as the relative weight an 
individual gives to future outcomes and negative aspects of their current situation (Owen et al., 
2008; Levene & Parker, 2011).  Moreover, many individuals, including those with major mental 
disorders such as schizophrenia, have their symptoms effectively treated and managed (e.g., 
National Institute of Mental Health, 2009). A common concern is that extending PAD to persons 
suffering from a mental disorder may lead to death of persons suffering from a treatable mental 
disorder (Dembo, 2010).   
  
 Systematic research on the decisional capacity of persons with a mental disorder is 
limited; however, existing empirical evidence suggests that although a mental disorder may 
impair some of the abilities required for decision-making (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995), 
decisional capacity is not always affected by the presence of a mental disorder (Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1995).  For instance, in a study of individuals with a mental disorder admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital, more than half (56.4%) of participants retained the ability to make rational 
decisions about their health care (Cairns et al., 2003).  Moreover, although problems in 
decisional capacity have been demonstrated in those with a severe mental disorder, decisional 
capacity is relatively unimpaired in those with mild or moderate forms of mental disorders 
(Owen et al., 2013).  Similarly, some individuals with a mental disorder may only have impaired 
decisional capacity when they are experiencing acute symptoms of their disorder and may 
otherwise be competent when experiencing a remission (Ventura et al., 2011).  In a study of 
decisional capacity among different diagnostic groups of patients admitted to a psychiatric 
hospital, Owens et al. (2008) found that decisional capacity was higher in persons with a mental 
disorder characterized by fluctuating symptoms, such as Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia, 
and lower for persons with more chronic disorders, such as Depression and Personality Disorder.   
 
Cognitive impairment alone cannot be determinative of decisional capacity to request 
PAD.  Stewart and colleagues (2010) suggest that the presumption of competence should be 
maintained, but “a cautious and rigorous examination of the effect of the mental disorder on the 
person’s competence” should be conducted (pg. 4).  Some believe that a single independent 
evaluation to determine a person’s decisional capacity to decide to request assistance with death  
is insufficient (Wenze, Gunthert, & German, 2012),  particularly in the case of disorders with 
fluctuating symptoms; periodic re-evaluations are needed where decisional capacity is expected 
to change over time (Ventura et al., 2011).   
   
When an individual is not currently suffering from symptoms of a mental disorder, the 
desire for death may represent a rational and well-thought out choice (e.g., Weinberger, 
Sreenivasan, & Garrick, 2014).  Some psychiatrists and psychologists opine that persons with a 
mental disorder are capable of making rational decisions regarding the circumstances of their 
death (Shah & Mukherjee, 2003).  Thus, although the presence of a mental disorder may raise 
concerns that the request for PAD is the result of distorted judgment, whether a person with a 
mental disorder is competent to make such a request likely needs to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis rather than inferring from general features of a particular diagnosis.  However, 
A Conceptual Framework     13 
important questions remain regarding how to determine whether a request for death is rational, 
who should determine this (e.g., the patient, the physician, psychologists, medical review boards, 
or the courts), and what criteria should be used to assess decisional capacity.  
   
If Competence is to be Assessed, Should the Standard be Higher to Request PAD 
than Other Non-Lethal Medical Decisions?  Assessments of decisional capacity in the context 
of end-of-life decision-making are focused primarily on whether individuals are legally 
competent to make decisions regarding treatment (Baron, 2000; Parker, 2000).  The law 
recognizes numerous distinct competences (i.e., driving capacity, marriage capacity, 
testamentary capacity, financial capacity, criminal capacity) that differ based on the abilities 
required for the task and consequences of the decision (Grisso, 1996).  Given the gravity of end-
of-life decisions, should we set a higher standard of competence for PAD decisions than other 
routine health care choices?  If so, what criteria or standards should apply?  Are different criteria 
and standards of competence justifiable in cases where a mental disorder is the primary or sole 
diagnosis versus when the individual is not suffering from a mental disorder?   
 
The standard of competence required to request PAD is heavily contested in the 
literature.  If the bar is too high, an individual’s decision-making autonomy is infringed upon.  If 
the bar is too low, sufficient protection for incompetent decision-makers is not provided.  Several 
scholars (e.g., Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Wilks, 1999; Zapf & Roesch, 2009) have argued that 
the standards for competence must vary according to the consequences of the decision (i.e., 
greater consequences require a higher the level of competence).  Some health care professionals 
advocate for a relatively high standard of competence and an extensive review of the decision to 
request PAD (Ganzini et al., 2000).  An inspection of the assisted death acts in Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg, suggest that in the case of hopeless and intolerable 
suffering, death is not considered a more harmful outcome for an individual (Berghmans, et al, 
2013).  Moreover, some authors have argued that competence to request PAD should not differ 
from competence to refuse life prolonging treatment (Baron, 2000; Parker, 2000).  The 
permanence of death, however, may warrant safeguards (Dembo, 2010).  It may be reasonable to 
require a formal clinical assessment for every individual requesting PAD to ensure the absence 
of a treatable mental disorder influencing an individual’s judgment (Werth et al., 2000).   
Reliable appraisal of decisional capacity will require a time-consuming clinical evaluation 
(Wenze et al., 2012).  This option, however, raises concerns about ability to pay.  A 
comprehensive clinical evaluation is likely to be expensive and may be out of reach for many 
individuals.   
 
What Test Should be used to Evaluate Competence to Request PAD?  Mental 
disorders compound difficulties in the assessment of competence (Akinsanya et al., 2009) and an 
inadequate assessment may attribute decisional capacity when it is absent, or fail to detect 
decisional capacity when it is present (Parker, 2013).  Structured assessments would ensure that 
decisional capacity is accurately and reliably evaluated (Lamont, Jeon, & Chiarella, 2012).  
However, currently, there is no legally defined test of competence to request PAD.  Several 
objective psychological measures are currently available to evaluate decisional capacity to 
consent to medical treatment, for example, the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – 
Treatment (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995) and the Hopkins Competency Assessment Test 
(Janofsky, McCarthy, & Folstein, 1992).  These instruments may need to be revised (or a new 
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measure developed) to include factors to be considered when evaluating decisional capacity to 
request PAD (e.g., the individual’s psychological and emotional state, the importance of 
supporting factors in the environment) to ensure that the evaluator consistently covers all 
relevant areas of decisional capacity in end-of-life decisions. 
 
Who Should Make the Determination of Competence?  In most jurisdictions that 
permit assisted death, the involvement of a physician to assess patient competence and 
voluntariness is considered a necessary safeguard.  However, the ability of physicians (with the 
exception of psychiatrists) to assess the presence and role of a mental disorder in health care 
decisions has been debated (but see also Appelbaum, 2007).  Research shows, for example, that 
due to a lack of knowledge or a failure to properly screen patients (Farberman, 1997), mental 
disorders have often gone undiagnosed, undertreated, or inappropriately treated in health care 
settings (Kathol, Bulter, McAlphine, & Kane, 2010; Mitchell, 2013; Young, Klap, Shelbourne, & 
Wells, 2001).xii  If symptoms of an underlying mental disorder are recognized, physicians may 
fail to recognize that the mental disorder is impairing judgment (Levene & Parker, 2011). 
Consideration must be directed to who should assess decisional capacity in the context of 
requests for PAD, particularly when the individual making the request suffers from a mental 
disorder. 
 
What is (or should be) the role of clinical psychologists?xiii Clinical psychologists are 
trained to assess mental disorders and relieve mental suffering, and some are trained to evaluate 
decisional capacity; thus, it would seem that clinical psychologists and psychiatrists are in a 
position to protect patient autonomy by determining whether a requesting patient has an 
underlying mental disorder that impairs judgment (Niederjohn & Rogers, 2009) as well as to 
determine whether there are reasonable alternatives to relieve a patient’s psychological suffering 
(Dees et al., 2013).  Forensic clinical psychologists have expertise in evaluating decisional 
capacity in a variety of contexts (e.g., fitness to stand trial, criminal responsibility, civil forensic 
decision capacity; competency to be executed; Roesch & Zapf, 2013).  Thus, psychologists with 
forensic training might be the most qualified to develop and administer measures to assess 
decisional capacity to request PAD.  
 
While clinical psychologists may be in a position to assist with assessments of decisional 
capacity, there are ethical considerations for serving in this role.  Within the field of clinical 
psychology, there is a general expectation for clinical psychologists to prevent harm among their 
patients (Bongar & Sullivan, 2013).  For instance, in typical clinical practice, when a patient 
commits suicide, concerns may arise about the clinician’s competence and the adequacy of their 
training (Schmitz et al., 2012).  The participation of psychologists in PAD practices could be 
construed as a violation of the standard to avoid harm and the standard to intervene in cases of 
suicidal crises (American Psychological Association, 2010; Canadian Psychological Association, 
2000; Johnson et al., 2014).  One major concern of psychologists’ involvement in evaluations of 
decisional capacity for assisted death is that their involvement would increase the potential for 
malpractice liability.  Similar to competency to be executed evaluations, psychologists should 
consider whether participation would violate their professional responsibility to avoid harm 
(Johnson et al., 2014).  If a psychologist feels that participation would violate professional ethics, 
he or she must decline involvement according to Standard 3.06 Conflict of Interest (American 
Psychological Association, 2010)/Standard III.35 Conflict of Interest (Canadian Psychological 
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Association, 2000).  Further, some authors have raised concerns that psychologists may end up 
taking on a gatekeeping role for PAD requests (Ryan, 2012).  Given that competence to request 
assistance with death could be challenging for an individual physician or psychologist to 
evaluate (American Psychological Association Workgroup on Assisted Suicide and End-of-Life 
Decisions, 2001; Dees et al., 2013), both professionals may be needed to independently and 
collaboratively assess decisional capacity. 
 
 What if a Person is Competent when Making a Request for PAD but Becomes 
Incompetent Before it is Carried Out?  In contrast to some persons with a general medical 
condition whose decisional capacity is relatively stable over time, a mental disorder 
compromising an individual's decisional capacity can fluctuate (Larrabee, 2011).  If a competent 
person with a mental disorder (e.g., someone suffering from a major mood or psychotic disorder) 
becomes incompetent before PAD is given it is unclear whether PAD should be administered.  
Issues that arise include: whether alternative provisions for end-of-life decisions among persons 
with a mental disorder should be enacted (for instance, a substitute decision maker), if 
competence should be a necessary condition to both request and receive PAD, and whether 
health care professionals will be required to restore competence to provide assisted death?  
Related to this, situations may arise in which an individual with a severe mental disorder 
develops a degenerative disease (e.g., cancer, ALS).  If deemed incompetent, an individual with 
a mental disorder would not meet the requirements for PAD, even though he or she also has a 
terminal medical condition and is in intolerable physical pain. 
 
An option considered in the literature is the use of advance directives.  If a patient’s 
decisional capacity to consent to medical treatment will be affected in the future, they can write 
an advance directive (or “living will”) to set out the procedures and treatments they do and do 
not consent to (Irvine, Osborne, & Mary, 2013).  Persons with a mental disorder can also write a 
psychiatric advance directive to declare their psychiatric treatment preferences in advance of 
onset of acute symptoms that may compromise decisional capacity (Srebnik et al., 2005; 
Swanson, Swartz, Ferron, Elbogen, & Van Dorn, 2006).   Should it be possible for a person to 
include a request for PAD in an advance directive (i.e., “advance assisted death directive”xiv) if 
their mental condition deteriorates?  Research has suggested that persons with a mental disorder 
can have difficulty understanding how advance directives work, due to lack of experiences with 
laws, difficulty understanding abstract concepts (e.g., future states), and other cognitive 
limitations (Swanson et al., 2003).  Moreover, although these directives reflect a person’s desires 
at the time of writing, they are not legally binding.  Mental health professionals may have 
concerns about the validity of these documents (e.g., whether an individual’s wishes have 
changed from the time the advance directive was written; Lemmens, 2012) and thus have 
concerns about honoring requests.  For example, in a survey of physicians, 54% reported that 
they would not perform PAD if requested in the form of an advance directive due to a lack of 
knowledge about interpretation of the law (Rurup, Onwuteaka‐Philipsen, van der Heide, van der 
Wal, & van der Maas, 2005).   
 
 To what Extent Should a Person’s Family be Involved in PAD Requests?  An 
individual should be allowed to exercise self-determination over the circumstances regarding his 
or her death (e.g., Doyal & Doyal, 2001).  However, the individual is not the only person 
affected by a decision to seek assistance with death; parents, spouses, children, and other loved 
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ones may be adversely affected by the decision (Bostwick & Cohen, 2009; Maris et al., 2000).  
Current policy in the U.S., Canada, and abroad does not require family members’ involvement in 
health-related decisions made by competent persons due to the need to uphold medical 
confidentiality, unless an individual is at risk to harm themselves or others (e.g., Freedom of 
Information Protection of Privacy Act, 1996; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of, 2010).  However, in European jurisdictions failure to consult family members before 
proceeding with PAD for persons with a mental disorder have resulted in malpractice claims or 
physicians being physically threatened by family members (Deschepper et al., 2014).  
 
   Research conducted over the past decade has shown that a patient’s outcome improves 
when family members are involved in treatment-related decisions (Dixon et al., 2014).  
Moreover, survey data of the general public suggests that a majority favor family involvement in 
PAD decisions, especially when the patient is suffering from a mental disorder (Frey & Hans, 
2015).  Family involvement, however, may also make patients more vulnerable to pressure from 
family members to choose PAD.  Family members involved in the lives and care of persons with 
a mental disorder often provide case management, financial assistance, and housing (Dixon et 
al., 2014).  This imposes considerable burdens (Schulze & Wulf, 2005) and family members may 
encourage persons with a mental disorder to opt for an early death due to burnout or for financial 
reasons.  Conversely, a person’s ability to make treatment-related decisions may be questioned 
when the family does not agree with the choice (Winter & Parks, 2008).  If and how family 
members should be involved in PAD decisions is unclear at this point.   
 
    A Summary of Internationally Developed Guidelines 
 
  Based on the analysis above, we strongly encourage jurisdictions that are considering 
extending (or have extended) PAD to persons with a mental disorder to implement additional 
safeguards and procedures, otherwise persons with a mental disorder may not be thoroughly 
assessed or adequately treated before decisions regarding PAD are made.  There are two types of 
safeguards: direct (i.e., legislation) and indirect (i.e., professional guidelines).  Given that 
legislation is not always effective or followed (Ganzini et al., 2008; Pereira, 2011), it is critical 
that professional bodies develop comprehensive professional guidelines for PAD for persons 
with a mental disorder.  One of the most helpful discussions of the professional and legal issues 
faced by mental health professionals for PAD was fleshed out in guidelines recommended by 
Werth, Benjamin, and Farrenkopf (2000) and commentaries on these guidesxv in the 2000 special 
issue of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law.  Werth et al’s (2000) guidelines concerned 
assessing competence and impaired judgment in decisions related to PAD in the context of the 
Oregon law.  In brief, the guide specified that assessment should include: (1) a review of 
previous and current medical records for psychiatric and physical issues, including opining 
whether the medical issues satisfy the requirements of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act; (2) 
the administration of psychological tests and questionnaires related to competence, mental status, 
cognitive functioning, depressive symptoms, and attitudes toward PAD; (3) a comprehensive 
clinical interview with the patient (see p. 367-370 for components of the interview); (4) collateral 
interviews with the patients’ significant others; and (5) a written report that details the 
assessment of decisional capacity and includes an opinion regarding the patients’ decisional 
capacity to make decisions related to PAD.xvi  As discussed earlier, this could be expensive and 
questions of who will carry the financial burden and the implications thereof must be considered.  
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  Three commentaries from legal professionals (Baron, 2000; Burt, 2000; Martyn & 
Bourguignon, 2000) and one from a psychiatrist (Youngner, 2000) provided critiques of the 
guidelines.  Baron (2000) recommended that rather than the a priori recommendations (i.e., 
based on logical necessity, rather than actual experience), there is a need for guidelines and 
criteria for competence assessments in this area to be drawn from case law which would indicate 
what issues need to be evaluated in such an assessment.  Baron also recommended that 
evaluations be recorded to be used as evidence for legal decision-makers if that becomes 
necessary.  Burt’s (2000) reply stated two criticisms of the Werth et al.’s (2000) guidelines: (a) 
“The proposed guidelines would require detailed, probing inquiry into motivations for choosing 
assisted [death].  This is an appropriate requirement in principle.  In practice, it will be virtually 
impossible to carry out this inquiry within the likely statutory time limits” (p. 382) and (b) “The 
guidelines provide false comfort that physician-assisted [death] can be carried out with 
adequately sensitive monitoring of voluntariness and mental competence” (p. 382).  Martyn and 
Bourguignon (2000) similarly argued that the guidelines would do little to aid in legal decision-
making for PAD because, despite guidance for best practice, physicians’ judgments will remain 
subjective and influenced by their own values.  Further, the use of physicians in competence 
determinations would place the decision-making power in the hands of physicians for PAD, 
rather than the courts.  Finally, Youngner (2000) stated that the guidelines are limited by (a) the 
lack of a clear definition and consistent use of the term decisional capacity, (b) the values and 
bias of clinicians making determinations of decisional capacity, and (c) a lack of detail on the 
relative importance and limitations of the psychological tests and questionnaires recommended 
by Werth et al. (2000).xvii  
 
  In crafting policies on PAD it is essential to take into account what current legislative 
frameworks have found to be effective.  Since the 2000 special issue of Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland have accumulated at least 10 years 
of experience with PAD for persons with a mental disorder.  Professional practices adopted in 
these countries may be useful in providing direction for regulating such practices in Canada and 
other jurisdictions who have recently introduced or are in the process of tabling PAD legislation, 
as well as jurisdictions that plan to extend PAD to persons with a mental disorder.  For several 
jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, the relevant 
assisted death acts and any professional guidelines on PAD are listed in Table 2 and summarized 
in Table 3. This discussion of international guidelines is not restricted to PAD for persons with a 
mental disorder; however, we clearly identify additional criteria that must be met if a request for 
PAD is from a person with a mental disorder.  
 
-- Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here-- 
 
Grievous and Irremediable Medical Condition 
 
  In all jurisdictions, a second opinion from an independent physician or specialist is 
required to verify the irremediable nature of the patient’s medical condition (i.e., there is no 
reasonable chance of recovering within a non-specified period of time).  If other eligibility 
requirements are satisfied, patients can refuse alternative treatments.  In all jurisdictions, there 
must be extensive documentation of the diagnosis, prognosis, and attempted treatments by the 
attending and the consulting physicians. 
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Intolerable Suffering 
 
  In all jurisdictions the attending physician must reasonably conclude that the patient’s 
suffering is intolerable and irremediable.  In the case of psychological suffering, the Acts of 
Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands require that a psychiatrist or psychologist conclude 
that there are no feasible alternatives to relieve the patient’s suffering.  To ensure an objective 
evaluation, Dutch medical guidelines instruct that great care is taken in assessing whether the 
psychological suffering is unbearable.  In all jurisdictions, the patient and doctor/psychiatrist 
must arrive at a joint decision that death would be preferable to ongoing suffering.   
 
Competence 
 
  In all jurisdictions the individual requesting PAD must possess decisional capacity at the 
time of the request.  In Switzerland and U.S. jurisdictions the standard of competence required to 
request PAD is similar to competence required for other medical decision-making (i.e., the 
individual must be able to understand treatment options, weigh information, and communicate a 
choice).  In Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands a definition for competence/decisional 
capacity is not specified in the Acts or professional guidelines.  No jurisdiction requires a 
psychiatric assessment to confirm decisional capacity for every patient making a request.  
However, in Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, where a mental disorder may be the 
primary medical condition, both a doctor and a psychiatrist/psychologist are required to evaluate 
whether the requesting patient has the decisional capacity to request PAD.  In Switzerland, 
medical guidelines specify that decisional capacity be evaluated by a third health care 
professional who is not necessarily a physician, which may include a psychiatrist. In U.S. 
jurisdictions if the attending physician believes that a terminal patient has a mental disorder 
causing impaired judgement, the physician must consult with a licensed psychiatrist, 
psychologist, or social worker and refer the patient to counselling.  In all jurisdictions, health 
care professionals, including psychiatrists/psychologists, are not required to participate in PAD.  
However, they must refer the patient to another health care professional who is willing to fulfill 
the request.  PAD cannot be included in advance  directives in U.S. jurisdictions, however, in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, if all other standards of legally sufficient care are 
met (e.g., voluntariness, competence) an individual is allowed to make a formal request for PAD 
in the form of an advance directive to be carried out if the individual becomes incompetent. 
 
Voluntariness 
 
  In all jurisdictions decisions must be well-considered and persistent over time.  For 
instance, in Oregon at least two requests more than 15 days apart must be made by a patient 
stating his or her wish to die.  Patients should also have adequate time to change their mind (e.g., 
at least a month from when the initial request was made), and any sign of ambivalence or 
uncertainty should abort the process.  In all jurisdictions, family members can be involved in the 
decision-making process at the patient’s request.  However, caution should be used, as it is 
important to determine whether family members are supporting PAD for selfish gain (e.g., 
financial gain, caregiver burnout) or are trying to override well-thought-out requests.  In 
addition, U.S. jurisdictions require a witness who is not a relative, entitled to the estate of the 
patient, or affiliated with a health care facility in which the patient is receiving care to verify a 
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patient’s voluntary request.       
 
       Concluding Remarks 
 
   The aim of this paper was to stimulate discussion on key issues that may arise in 
extending PAD to persons with a mental disorder, so that we as a field can have a thoughtful and 
considered discussion.  It is important to note that there are a number of complexities that were 
not sufficiently addressed in this paper.  For instance, ensuring that some persons requesting 
PAD are seen by two doctors, receive a comprehensive battery of tests, and have their 
competence restored to receive PAD have major resource implications that we were not able to 
comprehensively consider.  Further, concerns remain regarding whether the legalization of PAD 
for persons with a mental disorder may divert attention and resources from suicide prevention.  
Additional commentary from mental health professionals, as well as lawyers, ethicists, and 
philosophers, would be helpful in determining whether more harm is being done by not 
respecting an individual’s autonomous wishes or failing to engage in suicide prevention.  Each 
topic addressed in this paper (and others) warrants full discussion and we encourage our 
colleagues internationally to join us in this discussion. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1.  
Jurisdictions in Which Physician-Assisted Death (PAD) is Currently Legal, Decriminalized, or Practiced   
 
Jurisdiction Date Entered Into Law  
Terminal Medical Condition 
Necessary Condition for PAD 
 
PAD Permitted When Mental  
Disorder is the Sole Medical Condition   
    
Switzerland 1, a 1937 No Yes 
Japan 2, b 1962 Yes No 
Oregon 3, a 
(United States) 1996 Yes 
 
No 
Colombia 4,b 1997 Yes No 
The Netherlands 5,b 2001 No Yes 
Belgium 6, c 2002 No Yes 
Luxemburg 7, b 2008 No Yes 
Washington 8, a 
(United States) 
 
2008 Yes 
 
No 
Montana 9, a 
(United States) 2009 Yes 
 
No 
Vermont 10, a 
(United States) 2013 Yes 
 
No 
South Africa 11,b 2015 Yes No 
Canada 12, a In Effect 2016 No Not Specified 
California 13, a 
(United States) In Effect 2016 Yes 
 
No 
 
Note.  Jurisdictions are presented in chronological order with respect to the date that PAD became possible.  Not Specified = Restrictions 
have not yet been placed on which disorders do or do not qualify for PAD.  1 Article 115, Swiss Criminal Code (1937). 2 Hoshino (1993, 
1996); but see also Article 202, Japanese Penal Code (1907). 3 Oregon Death with Dignity Act (1997). 4 Colombia Constitutional Court 
(1997). 5 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act (2001). 6 The Belgium Act on Euthanasia (2002). 7 
Law of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (2008).  8 Washington Death with Dignity Act (2009). 9 Baxter v. Montana (2009); 
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Montana Death with Dignity Act (2010). 10 Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act (2013). 11 Stransham-Ford v. Minister of Justice 
and Correctional Services and Others (2015). 12 Cater v. Canada (2015).  13 The End of Life Option Act (2016).  
a Physician-assisted suicide but not physician-assisted euthanasia permitted. b Both physician-assisted euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide permitted.  c Physician-assisted euthanasia but not physician-assisted suicide permitted. 
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Table 2. 
Acts and Professional Guidelines of Jurisdictions that Permit Physician-Assisted Death (PAD) 
 
Jurisdiction1  Name of Act (Year) Name of Professional Guidelines (Year) 
   
Switzerland Not Available2 Guidelines on End-of-Life Care, Swiss Academy of Medical 
Sciences (2012) 2 
Oregon  
(United States) Oregon Death with Dignity Act (1997) 
Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A Guidebook for Health Care 
Providers, Task Force to Improve Care of the Terminally Ill 
The Netherlands Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
(2001)  
Standpoint on Euthanasia, Royal Dutch Medical Association 
(2002); Guidelines for Dealing with the Request for Assisted 
Suicide in Patients with a Psychiatric Illness (2009), Dutch 
Psychiatric Association 
Belgium The Belgium Act on Euthanasia (2002) Not Available3 
Luxemburg  
Law of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia and 
Assisted Suicide (2008) 
 
Not Available3 
Washington  
(United States) 
 
The Washington Death with Dignity Act 
(2008) 
 
Not Available3 
Montana  
(United States) Montana Death with Dignity Act (2010) 
Not Available3 
   
Vermont  
(United States) 
Patient Choice and Control at End of Life 
Act (2013) 
 
Not Available3 
 
Note.  1 In Colombia, Japan, and South Africa there are no acts or official guidelines on PAD, thus, these jurisdictions were not 
included in this Table.  2 Switzerland does not have any formal legislation on PAD in place; however, the Swiss Academy of Medical 
Sciences has put forth recommendations for physicians to follow when performing PAD. 3 Additional professional guidelines were not 
available or could not be obtained. 
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Table 3.  
Summary of International Practices for Determining Whether to Grant Requests for Physician-Assisted Death (PAD) 
 Jurisdiction 
Criterion of Legally Sufficient Care 
Switzerland Oregon, Washington,  
Vermont, and Montana 
(United States) 
The 
Netherlands 
Belgium Luxemburg 
 
Grievous and Irremediable Condition 
      
At least two health care professionals required to confirm 
diagnosis/prognosis 
Yes 
    
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusal of alternative treatments permitted if other 
eligibility requirements satisfied 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment attempts well documented Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intolerable Suffering       
Subjective-objective standard applied Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Suffering cannot be relieved by other reasonable or 
available means 
Not specified No Yes Yes Yes 
Psychologist required to confirm psychological suffering 
irremediable 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Competence       
Higher threshold of competence than other     
medical decision-making 
No No Not specified Not specified Not specified 
Mandatory psychiatric exam for every individual No No No No No 
Psychologist/psychiatrist can serve as an additional 
expert/specialist 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PAD can be requested in form of an advance directive Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntariness       
Decision persistent over time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adequate time to change mind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family involvement at request of the patient  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Figure 1. A Framework for Extending Access to Physician-Assisted Death (PAD) for Persons with a Mental Disorder: Legal, Ethical, 
and Clinical Considerations
•Should a mental disorder be a ground for requesting PAD?
•Should PAD be available for all types of mental disorders?
PAD for Persons with a Mental Disorder
•Should persons who refuse alternative treatment qualify for PAD?
•What if the person has been successfully treated or has had their symptoms remit in the past?
•What if there is no treatment or the individual is not responsive to available treatments?  
•How should intolerable suffering be assessed?
Defining Grievous and Irremediable Mental Disorder
•Should there be an assumption that a person requesting PAD is competent to make such a request?  
•If competence is to be assessed, should the standard be higher to request PAD than other non-lethal 
medical decisions?
•What test should be used to evaluate competence to request PAD? 
•Who should make the determination of competence? 
•What is (or should be) the role of clinical psychologists?
•What if a person is competent when making a request for PAD but becomes incompetent before it is 
carried out?
•To what extent should a person’s family be involved in PAD requests?
Mental Disorder and Competence
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Appendix A: International Cases of Physician-Assisted Death (PAD) on the Basis of a 
Mental Disorder 
 
Anorexia Nervosa: In the Netherlands, a 48-year old woman with a 30-year history of Anorexia 
Nervosa and depression obtained PAD after both her husband and mother died (Cohen-Almagor, 
2008). 
 
Antisocial Personality Disorder: In Belgium, a 50-year old man serving a life prison sentence 
for sexual assault and murder, was found eligible for PAD on the basis that he “would never be 
able to overcome his violent impulses and that his life was not worth living due to unbearable 
psychological suffering in prison”.  However, no doctors were willing to provide PAD (Scutti,  
2014). 
 
Bipolar Disorder: In Switzerland a 56-year old man with a 25-year history of Bipolar Disorder 
obtained PAD after deciding during a period in which his condition was stable that life was no 
longer worth living (Douez, 2011). 
 
Gender Dysphoria: In Belgium, a 44-year old man with Gender Dysphoria received PAD after 
a sex-change operation was unsuccessful (Gordts, 2013).   
 
Schizophrenia: In Switzerland, PAD was made available to a man with Schizophrenia who had 
been attempting to obtain PAD from other right-to-die organizations over the past 10 years 
(McKay, 2003).  
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Endnotes 
                                                          
i Not all jurisdictions require that the person offering assistance with death be a physician.  
However, as discussed below, physician-assisted death (PAD) is the most common model and so 
that is the label we use throughout the balance of this paper.  
 
ii These discussions should not be relied on as current or absolute explication of law. For 
additional information, we refer readers to the legal materials cited in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
iii Throughout this paper we use the term terminal or general medical condition to refer to 
medical conditions that exclude mental disorder (e.g., Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis [ALS], 
Multiple Sclerosis, Cancer, Human Immunodeficiency Virus [HIV]; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  The DSM-5 defines a mental disorder as a “clinically significant 
disturbance” in “cognition, emotional regulation, or behavior” that indicates a “dysfunction” in 
mental functioning that is “usually associated with significant distress or disability” in major life 
domains (e.g., work, relationships, or other areas of functioning; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, pg. 20).  Similarly, the ICD-10 defines a mental disorder as “a clinically 
recognizable set of symptoms or behaviours associated in most cases with distress and with 
interference with personal functions” (World Health Organization, 1992, pg. 11). 
 
iv Physician-assisted death is a model that includes both physician-assisted euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide.  Physician-assisted euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are often 
used interchangeably.  However, in medical practice and under the law they are treated 
differently.  Physician-assisted euthanasia involves the direct administration of life-ending drugs 
by a physician, whereas physician-assisted suicide involves the provision of life-ending 
medication by a physician that a person will self-administer (Materstvedt et al., 2003). 
 
v In their review of the criminal and penal codes of 192 countries and 50 U.S. states, 
Mishara and Weisstub (2015) found that 30 jurisdictions had no provisions in their criminal or 
penal codes regarding assisted death.  In these jurisdictions assisted death can be practiced 
because there are no laws rendering the practice illegal.  However, because there are no 
guidelines regulating the use of assisted death practices, it is not clear if assisted death is 
practiced by physicians in these jurisdictions. 
 
vi Throughout this paper we use the terms competence and decisional capacity 
interchangeably because the distinction between them is not consistently reflected in medical 
usage (Appelbaum, 2007).  Competence is a legal term that is determined by the courts and refers 
to the ability of an individual to make autonomous decisions that are sufficiently valid (Leo, 
1999).  In contrast, decisional capacity refers to an assessment made by a medical or mental 
health professional of an individual’s abilities to understand, appreciate, and manipulate 
information, form rational decisions, and communicate choices that are consistent with the legal 
standard for the task in question (Applebaum, 2010).   
 
vii The effect of this decision was suspended for 12 months to give the Canadian 
Parliament an opportunity to develop a legislative framework for PAD that is consistent with this 
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decision.  If the Canadian Government remains silent on this issue, physicians will be left to 
decide if and how to respond to requests for PAD.  
 
viii Another implication worth mentioning specific to Carter v. Canada (2015) is that the 
Supreme Court of Canada did not restrict access of PAD in Canada to Canadians.  Recall that the 
law prohibiting PAD was held to be invalid in certain circumstances because it is contrary to 
section 7 of the Charter.  Section 7 of the Charter applies to “everyone;” it is possible, therefore, 
that anyone who is on Canadian soil could have access to PAD.  This could lead persons with a 
non-terminal medical condition from other countries, including the U.S., to travel to Canada to 
die. 
 
ix Major Depressive Disorder is the most common mental disorder that is comorbid with 
suicidal ideation (Nock et al., 2008).  For example, for an individual’s symptoms to meet criteria 
for a Major Depressive Episode in DSM-V five or more symptoms need to be present, one of 
which may be recurrent thoughts of death, or recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, 
or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide.  However, an individual may still 
meet criteria for a Major Depressive Episode in the absence of suicidal ideation.   
 
x For instance, in a review of requests for PAD among 100 persons with a mental disorder 
in Belgium (some had more than one mental disorder), 50 had a personality disorder (e.g., 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Dependent Personality Disorder, Histrionic Personality 
Disorder, Avoidant Personality Disorder, Narcissistic Personality Disorder, Personality Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified), 14 had Schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder, 13 had Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, eleven  had an anxiety disorder, ten had an eating disorder, ten had a 
substance use disorder, ten had Bipolar Disorder, nine had a Somatoform disorder, eight  had a 
pervasive developmental disorder (Asperger’s Syndrome, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder), seven had Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and seven had a dissociative disorder 
(Thienpont et al., 2015). 
 
xi Not all mental disorders are alike in their intensity, recurrence, and duration of 
symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Organization, 1992), making 
it difficult to establish a standard set of disorders that would meet criteria for PAD.  Decisions 
may need to be made ex post facto (i.e., after the fact) regarding when persons with mental 
disorder meet the criteria for PAD. 
 
xii For instance, in some U.S. jurisdictions when an individual with a terminal medical 
condition requests PAD, the attending physician is required to present feasible alternatives (e.g., 
palliative care).  However, physicians are not required to be knowledgeable about how to relieve 
emotional suffering, thus their ability to recommend effective treatment alternatives to persons 
with a mental disorder is limited (Dilworth, Higgins, Parker, Kelly, & Turner, 2014). 
 
xiii Although this paper has focused on the role of psychologists in relation to PAD for 
persons with a mental disorder, this is not to suggest that psychology is reducible to mental 
disorder nor that psychologists should only be interested in PAD when it involves persons with a 
mental disorder.  Psychologists can and should become more active in other areas, such as 
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research, assessment, counselling, and advocacy related to end-of-life decisions and quality of 
care issues of persons with a terminal or general medical condition (see American Psychological 
Association Working Group on Assisted Suicide and End-of-Life Decisions, 2000). 
xiv This raises questions about physician-assisted suicide versus physician-assisted 
euthanasia.  Recall that physician-assisted suicide involves providing a person with a means to 
commit suicide whereas physician-assisted euthanasia involves administering the life-ending 
substance to the individual.  If a person’s condition has deteriorated to a point that he or she 
cannot self-administer a substance, physician-assisted euthanasia is the only alternative to fulfill 
the person’s wish to die.   
 
xv Jamison (2000) also provided guidance on factors medical professionals should 
consider in the context of PAD, many of which echo the guidelines by Werth, Benjamin, & 
Farrenkopf (2000).  Kerkhof (2000) also provided guidelines for PAD within the context of 
assisted death in the Netherlands.  Kerhof’s (2000) review focused on guidelines for PAD for 
persons with unbearable mental suffering.   
 
xvi The authors recommended that the report also included any other concerns arising 
from the assessment and treatment recommendations to restore judgment should it be determined 
that judgment is impaired. 
 
xvii For a response to these commentators by the authors’ of the guidelines see Werth, 
Farrenkopf, and Benjamin (2000). 
